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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PnocEss-VALIDITY OF REFUSAL TO PERMIT 
THE SHOWING OF A MOTION PICTURE ON THE GROUNDS OF OBSCENITY-A 
Chicago municipal ordinance made it unlawful to exhibit any motion picture 
without first having secured a permit from the Commissioner of Police. The 
commissioner is required to issue the permit unless he finds the picture "im-
moral or obscene. . .. "1 On these grounds he refused to permit exhibition of 
"The Miracle." Plaintiffs brought suit to have the ordinance declared un-
constitutional and to restrain enforcement of the prohibition on the picture. 
The trial court granted the relief asked. On appeal, held, reversed and re-
manded to determine if the motion picture is obscene. A prior restraint on the 
exhibition of obscene motion pictures does not violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. However, in determining whether the picture is obscene, the state has 
the burden of showing affirmatively that the dominant effect of the film, 
when considered as a whole, is substantially to arouse sexual desires, and that 
the probability of this effect outweighs whatever merits the film may possess. 
1 Chicago Municipal Code (1939) §155-4. 
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American Civil Liberties Union v. Chicago, 3 Ill. (2d) 334, 121 N. E. (2d) 
585 (1954), appeal dismissed for want of a final judgment, 75 S. Ct 572 
(1955). 
It is anomalous but true that only since 1952 have motion pictures been 
given protection as a form of speech under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.2 According to the earlier view, the exhibition of motion pictures was 
only a business and not included within the freedoms of speech or press.3 Prior 
restraint, as contrasted with subsequent criminal punishment, is the most 
offensive type of restriction upon freedom of expression and is the 
least likely to be upheld by the courts.4 Yet prior restraint upon obscene 
films has the support of dictum in a number of Supreme Court cases.5 
In the recent cases involving such prior restraint, the Court has consistently 
struck down the restraint.6 The opinion in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson7 
gives three possible attitudes toward licensing of movies: the basis of the re-
straint is not a legitimate interest of the state;8 the standard of the restraint, 
although in a valid area, is too inde6nite;9 the evidence does not show that 
the particular motion picture offends a valid standard of decency.10 There 
is support on the Court for still another view-that all prior restraints are 
void.11 Several decisions have struck down licensing provisions held valid 
by state courts, but the majority opinions give no particular grounds other 
than citing the Burstyn case.12 Thus, reversal of a New York case upholding 
2 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 72 S.Ct. 777 (1952), was the first 
case to hold that motion pictures were within the protection of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. See also United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 at 166, 68 S.Ct. 
915 (1948). 
3 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial C_omm., 236 U.S. 230, 35 S.Ct. 387 (1915). 
"Justice Holmes is said to have expressed regret, many years afterward, that he ever con-
curred in this decision and that he did not sense its consequences." CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH 
IN THE UNITED STATES 544 (1941). For one of many criticisms of this decision, see 60 
YALE L.J. 696 (1951). 
4 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 27 S.Ct. 556 (1907); Near v. Minnesota, 283 
U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666 
(1938); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 65 S.Ct. 315 (1945); 4 BLACKST. CoMM., 
Hammond ed., 151-152 (1890). 
5 Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766 (1942); Winters v. 
New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948); Near v. Minnesota, note 4 supra. 
6 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, note 2 supra; Superior Films v. Dept. of Education, 
346 U.S. 587, 74 S.Ct. 286 (1954); Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960, 72 S.Ct. 1002 (1952). 
7 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, note 2 supra. 
Bid. at 505. 
9 Id. at 507 et seq. Concerning the requirement of definite standards for censorship, 
see 14 MD. L. REv. 284 (1954). 
10 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, note 2 supra, at 506-507. 
11 In a concurring opinion in Superior Films v. Dept. of Education, note 6 supra, at 
589, Justice Douglas, with Black concurring, took a rigid view: ''In order to sanction a 
system of censorship I would have to say that 'no law' does not mean what it says, that 
'no law' is qualified to mean 'some' laws. I cannot take that step." Because these justices 
concurred on this ground it is fair to say that the basis of the majority opinion must not 
have been an absolute ban on censorship. 
12 Superior Films v. Dept. of Education, note 6 supra; Gelling v. Texas, note 6 supra. 
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a prior restraint because the movie was "immoral" and "tended to immorality," 
construed by the state court to mean only sexual immorality, may mean that 
this is not a valid standard by which to prevent the showing of a motion 
picture, or it may be that the facts did not show the particular motion picture 
to be immoral or tending to immorality.13 Thus, no decision squarely pre-
cludes censorship of obscene material.14 The principal case presents clearly 
the issue of whether or not a state or city may prevent exhibition of a motion 
picture because it is obscene. The holding that the ordinance was valid squares 
with what indications there are of the Supreme Court's views. 
The clear and present danger test, usually applied to restraints upon free 
speech, 15 is not applied in the area of censorship for obscenity except as it may 
be tacitly assumed by the court that publication or exhibition of obscene material 
automatically meets that test.16 If prior restraint upon obscenity is valid at all, 
the test does not seem to apply as an additional requirement. The principal 
case, by inference, rejects the clear and present danger test for obscene movies 
when it states that a movie must be judged as a whole in terms of its effect 
on the normal viewer and that its tendency to arouse sexual desires must be 
balanced against its merits. 
Obscenity has long been considered a definite enough standard for criminal 
statutes,17 more because it is necessary to have some standard than because it 
provides a clear, easily workable test18 The modem test is "whether a publica-
tion taken as a whole has a libidinous effect"19 upon the ordinary reader, i.e., 
whether it exploits "dirt for dirt's sake." If it is true that morality is "necessary 
13 Superior Films v. Dept. of Education, note 6 supra, involved two appeals, one from 
Ohio and one from New York. In the Ohio case a license to exhibit the picture was denied 
because the picture was found "harmful." This standard is obviously invalid. In the 
New York case a state court denied the license because the movie was inunoral and "would 
tend to corrupt morals." The state court had limited immorality to mean sexual inunorality. 
The particular ground for the decision is not determinable from the per curiam opinion 
reversing the state court. 
14 Some cases have held a prior restraint upon obscene materials valid where the 
issue was the revocation of the privilege of using the mails, but not where a right of free 
expression was restricted. Knowles v. United States, (8th Cir. 1909) 170 F. 409; United 
States v. Rebhuhn, (2d Cir. 1940) 109 F. (2d) 512. 
15 Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247 (1919), dealt with free 
expression of political ideas. 
16 Antieau, "The Rule of Clear and Present Danger: Scope of Its Applicability," 48 
MICH. L. RBv. 811 at 829 et seq. (1950); 1 CHAFEE, GovERNMENT AND MAss CoM-
MUNICATION 54 (1947). 
11 Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 16 S.Ct. 434 (1896); United States v. 
Rebhuhn, note 13 supra; New American Library of World Literature v. Allen, (D.C. Ohio 
1953) 114 F. Supp. 823; United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," (2d Cir. 1934) 
72 F. (2d) 705; Attorney General v. One Book named "Forever Amber," 323 Mass. 302, 
81 N.E. (2d) 663 (1948). For a history of the censorship of literature, see Alpert, "Judi-
cial Censorship of Obscene Literature," 52 HARV. L. RBv. 40 (1938). 
1s CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN nm UNITED STATES 531 (1941); 52 MICH. L. RBv. 
575 at 578 (1954). 
19 United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," note 17 supra, at 707. See also 
United States v. One Obscene Book Entitled "Married Love," (D.C. N.Y. 1931).48 F. 
(2d) 821. 
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to good government and the happiness of mankind,"20 it is not unreasonable 
to say that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting its citizens, particularly 
its youth, from exhibition of dirt for dirt's sake.21 However, there is always 
danger that th~ censor will use the indefiniteness of the standard to prohibit 
the expression of ideas repulsive to him personally rather than material in-
herently obscene. This danger is great enough to convince some writers that 
there should be no censorship at all, even for obscenity.22 However, this 
danger is met by judicial review of the finding of obscenity, and, as in the 
principal case, by placing upon the state the burden of showing obscenity. 
Donald F. Oosterhouse, S.Ed. 
20 An Ordinance for the Government of the Northwest Territory, art. III (1787). 
21 The argument that subsequent criminal punishment is inadequate ignores the possi-
bility that fear of punishment may operate, in effect, as a stricter prior restraint than 
licensing. 
22 CHAFEB, Frum SPBBCH m nm UNITED STATBS 547-548 (1941); 42 CALIF. L. 
RBv. 122 (1954). 
